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A new beginning in German foreign policy. 
Merkel wants to be an honest broker 
 
Gunther Hellmann  
 
 
FRANKFURT When Chancellor Angela Merkel delivered her first major address to the 
German Parliament on Wednesday, one theme that had figured prominently in her 
predecessor's speeches was missing. Merkel did not waste time imitating Gerhard 
Schröder's incessant preoccupation with Germany's new-found "self-confidence" in 
international affairs. She knows that her predecessor's foreign policy legacy is meager at 
best.  
  
Germany's traditional friendship with the United States has been shaken. Relations with 
its smaller allies to the east have suffered as a result of Schröder's penchant for cultivating 
German-Russian relations over their heads. Yet none of this has really paid off. It is 
highly symbolic that the end of Schröder's tenure coincided with the defeat of his most 
ambitious project, to secure a permanent seat for Germany on the United Nations 
Security Council.  
  
The German public's verdict on Schröder's foreign policy record, unsurprisingly, is not 
very favorable. Fifty percent of Germans felt that Germany was successful in international 
affairs in 2002, but only 24 percent thought so in spring 2005.  
  
For Merkel this legacy carries several opportunities. Her first moves underline that she is 
determined to seize them. As her key foreign policy adviser, Merkel chose a highly 
talented diplomat, Christoph Heusgen, who is known both for his opposition to 
Schröder's prestige-driven foreign policy agenda and his strong conviction that Germany 
has to rebalance its relations with its key allies in the West.  
  
Both Merkel and Heusgen are known to believe strongly that European integration and 
trans-Atlantic partnership must not be construed as opposites. They also subscribe to the 
view that there is a fundamental difference between close allies that share key interests as 
well as values (such as the other European Union members and the United States) and 
crucial partners (such as Russia) with whom Germany may share major interests but with 
whom it differs on key values.  
  
The central theme of Merkel's address on Wednesday, "to wage more freedom," has been 
interpreted almost exclusively as a reference to her personal background and as a pointer 
to the necessity of domestic reform. Yet her emphasis on fostering a "partnership of common values" with the United States hints that there may also be a subtle foreign 
policy message of general support to the American president.  
  
Merkel's team has taken care to arrange her first visits abroad in a highly symbolic 
sequence. Like most chancellors before her, Merkel paid her first tribute to the French 
president. Unlike the others, however, she traveled to Brussels the same day to meet key 
representatives of the EU and NATO. It is clear that Merkel is determined to act as an 
honest broker within the EU as well as between Europe and America.  
  
Bilateral relations are likely to be judged on the basis of whether they will meet common 
purposes. Remarkably, German-French relations were not highlighted in Merkel's address, 
whereas Poland was singled out as an example of an area where the new government 
wants to "practice" its new role.  
  
For German diplomacy, a return to a moderating and mediating role in European and 
trans-Atlantic politics is desperately needed. Given Germany's size, geopolitical position 
and historical legacy, no other country can play this role as well. In order to succeed, 
however, at least three conditions have to be met.  
  
First, given the distribution of power between the foreign ministry, which is now headed 
by the Social Democrats, and the chancellery, it is essential that Merkel and the new 
foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, come to an agreement on questions of basic 
strategy. Given the fact that both are known for their pragmatic approach to politics this 
should be the least difficult hurdle. 
  
Second, the political landscape has fundamentally changed since the pre-unification days 
when Germany used to act as a moderator between Europe and America. Reaching 
compromise has become more difficult in the EU, after the most recent round of 
enlargement, and in the trans-Atlantic arena, where both sides feel that they no longer 
depend as much on each other. To succeed, Germany will have to convince its allies that 
the Euro-Atlantic framework remains vital to both sides. Merkel's plea for mutual trust is 
an important change in atmospherics, but it can only be a first step.  
  
Finally, Germany is no longer in a position to facilitate compromises by taking up a major 
share of the bill. In this regard Merkel has made it clear that she will stick to the line laid 
down by Schröder. So without a basic willingness on the part of Germany's partners to 
compromise, it will be difficult to break the impasses facing the EU and NATO.  
  
These difficulties notwithstanding, Merkel's election provides a new opening that should 
be seized by decision makers in Europe and America. 
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